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I. INTRODUCTION
For approximately sixty years, the Washington State Supreme
Court deemed the protections afforded by article I, section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the federal
Constitution as "in substance the same," 1 despite the obvious difference
in the language of the two provisions. Article 1, section 7 of the state
constitution mandates that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." 2 In contrast, the
Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
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particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized." 
3
However, in the 1980 case State v. Simpson, the Washington Su-
preme Court began to give effect to the significant disparity in language
between the two provisions.4 The court, guided by the plain language of
article I, section 7, and evidence that the framers of the Washington Con-
stitution (framers) rejected a proposal to adopt the language of the Fourth
Amendment, determined that article I, section 7 provides greater protec-
tion to Washington residents than its federal counterpart.5 Following
Simpson, the Washington Supreme Court unleashed a series of opinions
affirming this proposition, with each successive case citing to Simpson
and the cases that followed.6 By the late 1990s, the Washington Su-
preme Court had confidently declared, "[i]t is by now axiomatic that arti-
cle I, section 7 provides greater protection to an individual's right of pri-
vacy than that guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment." 7
To be sure, a constitutional analysis begins with the text, and for
most purposes, should end there as well.8 But a proposition that has little
support in Washington case law from the first ninety years of statehood
can hardly be deemed self-evident. This is particularly true given that
the Washington Supreme Court has made little effort to ascertain the in-
tent of the framers beyond that made in Simpson. Indeed, the court in
State v. Ringer essentially threw up its hands before even attempting
such an inquiry when it declared that "[u]nfortunately, history provides
little guidance to the intention of the framers when they chose the spe-
cific language of Const. art. 1, § 7."9
This Article will demonstrate that history does in fact provide guid-
ance to the intention of the framers when they rejected the language of
the Fourth Amendment and adopted the unique language of article I,
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980). State v. Hehman marked Wash-
ington State Supreme Court's first explicit departure from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
but the court did so based on public policy grounds. 90 Wash. 2d 45, 47, 578 P.2d 527, 529 (1978).
5. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d at 178-79, 622 P.2d at 1205 (citing THE JOURNAL OF THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: 1889, 497 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962)) [hereinaf-
ter JOURNAL].
6. See, e.g., State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151, 153 (1984) (citing State v.
Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 818, 676 P.2d 419, 422 (1984); State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686,
674 P.2d 1240 (1983); State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d
170, 622 P.2d 1199.
7. State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486, 493, 987 P.2d 73, 78 (1999); State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash.
2d 103, 111,960 P.2d 927, 931 (1998); State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 69 n.1, 917 P.2d
563, 567 n.l (1996).
8. State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 146 Wash. 2d 445,460, 48 P.3d 274, 281 (2002).
9. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 691,674 P.2d at 1243.
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section 7.1° Contrary to the Ringer court's assertion, federal and state
case law, legal academic articles, and newspaper articles from the late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century provide a wealth of in-
formation from which the rationale behind the framers' decision to
choose the specific language in article I, section 7 can be hypothesized.
Part II of this Article summarizes what is currently known about the
development of article I, section 7 at the Washington State Constitutional
Convention. Part III will argue that the framers chose the language in
article I, section 7, in part, as a result of a salient issue before federal
courts between 1881-1897: whether, and to what extent, Congress may
authorize a legislative or executive body to compel witnesses to testify,
to produce documents, and to find a party in contempt for failing to do
SO.1 Part III-A discusses why the framers likely chose broad terms such
as "disturbed" and "invaded," as opposed to the Fourth Amendment's
reference to "search and seizure." Part III-B demonstrates that rapid ad-
vances in technology and the public's increasing concerns about privacy
led to the framers' choice of "private affairs" for article I, section 7 as
opposed to "persons ... papers, and effects." Part III-C suggests that, by
"authority of law," the framers likely meant disturbances of residents'
private affairs conducted under the authority of a statute or common law
principle. Finally, Part IV examines the implications of the unique lan-
guage in article I, section 7, including whether Washington has a consti-
tutionally mandated exclusionary rule and whether there are any limita-
tions on the legislature and court's ability to authorize disturbances of
residents' private affairs.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
AT THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
As several Washington Supreme Court opinions have suggested,
there is very little information available in the official records of the State
Constitutional Convention indicating why the framers rejected the lan-
guage of the Fourth Amendment and used the unique language in article
10. The language was unique until 1910 when the Arizona State Constitutional Convention
adopted article I, section 7 verbatim for its own declaration of rights. See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8.
Records from the Arizona Convention reveal only that the Committee on Preamble and Declaration
of Rights examined Washington's Declaration of Rights and decided to recommend it to the Com-
mittee of the Whole with only minor alterations. Each provision was proposed to the Committee of
the Whole individually, and the committee adopted article I, section 7 without debate. THE
RECORDS OF THE ARIZONA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1910, 658-59 (J. S. Goffed. 1991).
11. See United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S 168
(1881); In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241 (N.D. Cal. 1887).
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I, section 7.12 The federal government's appropriation of funds to the
convention was insufficient to cover the cost of transcribing several court
reporters' shorthand notes of speeches and arguments. 13  These notes
were either lost or destroyed. 14 The Secretary of State did preserve the
minute book from the convention, which was published in 1962 as the
Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention (Journal).15
By examining the official Journal and local newspaper coverage of
the state convention, it is possible to determine who changed the lan-
guage of article I, section 7 and approximately when that change was
made.' 6 The first proposal to adopt the language of the Fourth Amend-
ment came as a component of a proposed constitution that had been pre-
pared by W. Lair Hill, a prominent lawyer in both Oregon and Califor-
nia. 17 Mr. Hill's proposed constitution was printed in the Morning Ore-
gonian shortly before the convention,18 was placed on the desk of each
delegate at the start of the convention, and was a considerable influence
on the framers.' 9
Just after the start of the convention, on July 11, 1889, Delegate Al-
len Weir, an editor and Republican from Port Townsend,2° submitted to
the convention a preamble and bill of rights based largely on the provi-
sions contained in Mr. Hill's proposed constitution.2' Article I, section 7
of Mr. Weir's submission (proposed section 7) contained the text of the
Fourth Amendment.22 That same day, the proposal was referred to the
Committee on Preamble and Bill of Rights (Rights Committee).23
12. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 178, 622 P.2d 1199, 1205 (1980); Ringer,
100 Wash. 2d at 698, 674 P.2d at 1247.
13. See JOURNAL, supra note 5, at vii.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. The Washington Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, used the Journal in conjunc-
tion with newspaper accounts of the convention to determine the original intent of the framers. See,
e.g., Wash. Water Jet Workers Ass'n v. Yarbrough, 151 Wash. 2d 470, 485, 90 P.3d 42, 49 (2004).
17. See JOURNAL, supra note 5, at v.
18. MORNING OREGONIAN, July 4, 1889, at 9.
19. JOURNAL, supra note 5, at v.
20. Men of Washington-Facts About the Members of the Convention-Their Occupations and
Politics, MORNING OREGONIAN, July 16, 1889, at 2 [hereinafter Members of the Convention].
21. See JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 50-53, 497; MORNING OREGONIAN, July 12, 1889, at 2.
22. See JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 51.
23. MORNING OREGONIAN, July 12, 1889, at 2. The Rights Committee consisted of seven
members: C.H. Warner (Chairman), a miller and Democrat from Colfax; Gwin Hicks (Secretary), a
Democrat from Tacoma; Geo Comegys, a stockman and Republican from Oakesdale; Francis Henry,
a lawyer and Democrat from Olympia; Frank M. Dallam, an editor and Republican from Davenport;
J.C. Kellogg, a doctor and Republican from Seattle; and Lewis Sohns, a banker and Republican from
Vancouver. JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 19; see also Members of the Convention, MORNING
OREGONIAN, July 16, 1889, at 2.
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The first sign that the Rights Committee was considering signifi-
cant changes to proposed section 7 was on July 12, 1889, when the Ta-
coma Daily Ledger reported that in the days to follow, "[p]rovisions will
be made to prevent searching the residence of a private citizen without
due process of law.",24  However, the language of proposed section 7
stayed consistent with the Fourth Amendment until at least July 16,
1889.25
Between July 16, 1889, and July 25, 1889, there is little evidence
regarding the activities of the Rights Committee in connection with pro-
posed section 7. However, the change in language must have been made
as a result of debates within the Rights Committee itself because it does
not appear that any proposal to change the language of proposed section
7 came from the Committee of the Whole.26 On July 25, 1889, Rights
Committee Chairman Warner presented the final proposal of the bill of
rights to the Committee of the Whole, which included section 7 in its
present form. 27 Although there was some debate over the wording of
several other provisions, the Committee of the Whole adopted article I,
section 7 without debate on July 29, 1889.28
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE UNIQUE LANGUAGE IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
Between July 16 and July 25, 1889, the Committee of the Whole
spent a significant amount of time formulating the articles establishing
the judicial and executive branches. 29 Thus, while the Rights Committee
was considering changes to the language of proposed section 7, it was
also contemplating the power of each branch of government and the
power of each branch with respect to the other branches. Based on the
24. The Bill of Rights-Other Provisions To Be Inserted, TACOMA DAILY LEDGER, July 13,
1889, at 4. The Ledger reported that the Rights Committee was "following closely California's
constitution." Id. However, that document's search and seizure provision is virtually identical to the
Fourth Amendment. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. IV with CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
25. Work in Committees-Proposed Bill of Rights, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 17,
1889, at 1; Synopsis of the Bill of Rights in Advance For "Globe" Readers, TACOMA MORNING
GLOBE, July 17, 1889, at 1.
26. JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 497; see Committee Reports, Etc., MORNING OREGONIAN, July
18, 1889, at 1; Reports from Committees, SPOKANE FALLS REVIEW, July 19, 1889, at 1.
27. See JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 497; The Bill of Rights, MORNING OREGONIAN, July 26, at
1-2.
28. See JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 154; The Bill of Rights Adopted, TACOMA DAILY LEDGER,
July 30, 1889, at 4; The Bill of Rights-The Committee Will Report Back the Troublesome Preamble,
TACOMA MORNING GLOBE, July 30, at 1.
29. See, e.g., The Washington Constitution-Makers Hard at Work, DAILY OREGON
STATESMAN, July 23, 1889, at 1; The New Judiciary, MORNING OREGONIAN, July 20, 1889, at 1,
col. 6.
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amount of detail the Committee of the Whole went into in its debates,3 °
the members must have been aware of some of the more significant con-
temporary legal issues relating to the power of government. One such
issue that appeared sporadically in the federal courts around the time of
the framing of the state constitution was the extent and mechanisms by
which each branch could compel a witness to testify before a government
body, produce papers and other effects, and find a person in contempt for
failing to do so.
31
This issue first presented itself to the United States Supreme Court
in the 1881 case, Kilbourn v. Thompson.32 In Kilbourn, the United States
House of Representatives passed a resolution forming a committee to
inquire into the affairs of Jay Cooke & Company, a debtor to the United
States government. As part of its investigation, the Committee, under
authority of a House resolution, issued a subpoena for Kilbourn to appear
and to produce certain records, papers, and maps relevant to Jay Cooke's
transactions. Kilbourn refused. In response, the House found Kilbourn in
contempt and issued a warrant directing the sergeant-at-arms to arrest
Kilbourn and commit him to custody.33
Kilbourn subsequently brought suit for false imprisonment against
the House Speaker, members of the Committee, and the House Sergeant-
at-Arms. 34 Judgment was initially in favor of the defendants; however,
the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case with respect to the House
sergeant-at-arms. 35  The Court concluded that the House (1) does not
have "the general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the
citizen"; (2) assumed a power judicial in nature; (3) does have a limited
power to imprison a party for contempt in circumstances expressly stated
in the Constitution or where it was necessarily implied from the House's
constitutional functions and duties; and (4) exceeded its authority by
delegating to the Committee the task of conducting an investigation into
Kilbourn's private affairs, an investigation which could not result in
valid legislation.36
30. Judiciary Clause-The Constitutional Convention Still Considering It, SEATTLE TIMES,
July 20, 1889, at 1.
31. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S 168
(1881); In re Pac. Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241 (N.D. Cal. 1887).
32. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Because the resolution and warrant were passed while Congress was in session, the Court
concluded that the members of the Committee and House Speaker were immune from suit under the
Speech and Debate clause of the federal Constitution. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 200-05.
36. Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 190, 192, 194-95.
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Just five years later, in United States v. Boyd,37 the Court was con-
fronted with an alleged attempt by an executive officer to compel a party
to produce certain documents in court. At issue was section 12 of the
Customs Act (Customs Act), which declared that any importer who
fraudulently imported merchandise with the intent to deprive the United
States of lawful duties would be subject to a fine or imprisonment and
forfeiture of the goods. 38 With respect to all non-criminal proceedings
under section 12, section 5 provided:
[A]n attorney representing the government... may make a written
motion, particularly describing such book, invoice, or paper, and
setting forth the allegation he expects to prove; and thereupon the
court... may... issue a notice to the defendant or claimant to pro-
duce ... [the items] ... [I]f the defendant shall fail or refuse ... the
allegations stated in the said motion shall be taken as confessed.
But the owner of said books and papers ... shall have ... custody
of them, except pending their examination in court as aforesaid.39
Although similar procedures had been upheld by numerous lower federal
courts,n° the U.S. Supreme Court found section 5 repugnant to both the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments.41 In its Fourth Amendment analysis, the
Boyd majority reluctantly acknowledged that "certain aggravating inci-
dents of actual search and seizure, such as forcible entry into a man's
house and searching amongst his papers, are wanting. 42 Nevertheless,
the majority went to great lengths to demonstrate that the "compulsory
production of a man's private papers" authorized by section 5 was
"within the scope of the Fourth Amendment" because it "effects the sole
object and purpose of search and seizure.
' - 3
First, the Court observed that searches for and seizures of stolen
goods, goods concealed to avoid revenue laws, counterfeit coin, lottery
tickets, and gambling implements were reasonable because those
37. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
38. Id
39. Id. at 619-20 (1886), abrogation recognized by Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391(1976).
40. Stockwell v. United States, 23 F. Cas. 116 (Me. 1870) (No. 13,466); In re Platt, 19 F. Cas.
815 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 11,212); United States v. Hughes, 26 F. Cas. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No.
15,417); United States v. Three Tons of Coal, 28 F. Cas. 149 (D.C. Wis. 1875) (No. 16,515); United
States v. Mason, 26 F. Cas. 1189 (D.C.N.D. Ill. 1875) (No. 15,735); United States v. Distillery No.
Twenty-Eight, 25 F. Cas. 868 (D.C. Ind. 1875) (No. 14,966).
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searches and seizures were authorized by common law or statute.44 On
the other hand, the Court found a search for or seizure of a person's pri-
vate papers for the purpose of obtaining the contents or to use those pa-
pers as evidence against the person, was extortion.45 The Court justified
this distinction by noting that in the former case, either the government
or the true owner of the goods is entitled to possession of the property,
while in the latter, the private party is entitled to possession.46
Second, the Court recounted the use of "general" warrants in the
colonial era and quoted extensively from the 1765 English case, Entick v.
Carrington,47 which was "in the minds of those who framed the Fourth
Amendment" and was considered to be "sufficiently explanatory of what
was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures. 48 Entick involved an
action for trespass against government officials who entered the plain-
tiffs home pursuant to a general warrant, broke open his desk, and ex-
amined his papers.49 In an opinion by Lord Camden, the English high
court held that the general warrant at issue was "illegal and void" be-
cause: (1) "every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a
trespass"; (2) if a trespass has been demonstrated, the trespasser must
show some statute or common law principle that justified the intrusion;
and (3) the government trespassers could not demonstrate any cases
"where the law forceth evidence out of the owner's custody by proc-
ess." 50 The Boyd majority argued that "[t]he principles laid down in this
44. Id. at 623-24. The Boyd majority cited, as examples, several additional procedures that
were not within the prohibition of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment: (1) "the supervision authorized to
be exercised by officers of the revenue over the manufacture or custody of excisable articles, and the
entries thereof in books required by law to be kept for their inspection"; (2) "[t]he entry upon prem-
ises, made by a sheriff or other officer of the law, for the purpose of seizing goods and chattels by
virtue of a judicial writ, such as an attachment, a sequestration, or an execution"; and (3) "examina-
tion of a defendant under oath after an ineffectual execution, for the purpose of discovery secreted
property or credits, to be applied to the payment of a judgment against him." Id.
45. Id. at 630.
46. Id. at 623. For further discussion of the influence property rights had on the Boyd majority
opinion, see id. at 627-29 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.
B. 1765)); Sanford Pitler, The Origin and Development of Washington's Independent Exclusionary
Rule, 61 WASH. L. REV. 459, 524-25 (1986); Comment, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitu-
tionally Protected Privacy under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 945-60
(1977); Comment, The Life and Times ofBoyd v. United States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184,
184-90 (1977).
47. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K. B. 1765).
48. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626-27.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 628-29 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.
1765)).
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opinion ... reach farther than the concrete form of the case then before
the court." 51
[T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the government .. of
the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of the doors, and the rummaging of his drawers that con-
stitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his inde-
feasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property .... [A]ny forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's
own testimony or for his private papers to be used as evidence to
convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemna-
52tion of [Entick].
Finally, the Court concluded that the civil penalties authorized by
the Customs Act were criminal in nature 53 and held that section 5 also
violated the Fifth Amendment.54 The Court was "unable to perceive that
the seizure of man's private books and papers to be used in evidence
against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a wit-
ness against himself., 55 Therefore, the majority concluded that (1) sec-
tion 5 was unconstitutional and void; (2) the trial court's admission of
evidence pursuant to section 5 was erroneous and rendered the proceed-
ings unconstitutional; and (3) consequently, it must reverse the judgment
of the district court and remand the case for a new trial.56
The concurring opinion in Boyd, authored by Justice Miller, argued
that section 5 was void as applied because, while the procedure defined
in section 5 was in effect a subpoena duces tecum, the penalty for the
witness's failure to produce the incriminating papers was to take the al-
legations of the attorney respecting them as confessed; this would violate
the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelling a person to be a
witness against himself.57 However, Miller also disagreed with the ma-
jority's Fourth Amendment analysis. First, Miller noted that section 5
did not in fact authorize any search because, under the statute, "[n]o or-
der can be made by the court . . . which requires or permits anything
more than service of notice on a party to the suit."' 58 Nor was any seizure
authorized because the party was not required to part with custody of the
papers at any time. Finally, Miller noted that while the Framers of the
51. Id. at 630.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 633-35.
54. Id. at 632.
55. Id. at 633.
56. Id. at 638.
57. Id. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring).
58. Id.
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federal Constitution had their attention drawn to the abuses of power of
English authorities under general warrants that "authorized searches in
any place for any thing," they intended only to restrain the abuse,
"[h]ence it is only unreasonable searches and seizures that are forbid-
den."
59
Just one year after the Boyd decision was rendered, the holdings of
Kilbourn and Boyd intersected in the case In re Pacific Railway Commis-
sion.60 This case involved a challenge to an act of Congress that estab-
lished the Pacific Railway Commission (Railway Commission) to inves-
tigate the Central Pacific Railroad Company's use of land it received
from Congress as consideration for building a road.61 Congress author-
ized the Railway Commission to seek the aid of federal courts when a
witness refused to testify or produce documents, and granted the federal
courts discretion to order a contemptuous individual to obey the Railway
Commission's subpoena, insofar as the subpoena was within the Com-
mission's jurisdiction.62
The Circuit Court of California quoted with approval from Boyd for
the principle that "[a]ny compulsory discovery by extorting the party's
oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to
convict him of a crime or to forfeit his property is contrary to the princi-
ples of a free government":
The language thus used had reference, it is true, to the compulsory
production of papers as a foundation for criminal proceedings, but it
is applicable to any such production of the private books and papers
of a party otherwise than in the course of judicial proceedings, or a
direct suit for the purpose. It is the forcible intrusion into, and com-
pulsory exposure of, one's private affairs and papers, without judi-
cial process, or in the course of judicial proceedings, which is con-
trary to the principles of a free government ....
In addition, the court cited to Kilbourn as evidence of the "right of the
citizen to protection in his private affairs against the unlimited scrutiny
of investigation by a congressional committee., 64 The Court observed
59. Id. at 641 (Miller, J., concurring).
60. 32 F. 241 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887).
61. Id. at 249, 259-60.
62. Id. at 249-50.
63. Id. at 251.
64. Id. at 250-51. The court began its analysis by making a sweeping statement about the value
of the right to "personal security":
Of all the rights of the citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his
peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves, not merely pro-
tection of his person from assault, but exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers
[Vol. 31!:431
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that the Railway Commission's investigation overreached into the private
business of citizens and then concluded that the provision at issue was
void because Congress was effectively requiring the federal courts to aid
the Railway Commission in its investigation and improperly requiring
the judiciary to invoke its power when no case or controversy enumer-
ated in the Constitution existed.65
These issues would continue to be discussed in the federal courts
throughout the 1890s, 6 6 but by the time the Rights Committee met in late
July 1889, they were likely aware that search or seizure was not the only
means by which the government could potentially intrude into the private
affairs of individuals. The Rights Committee was thus faced with the
question of how to draft a provision using terms that would incorporate
the protections of the Fourth Amendment while ensuring the legislature
and courts would have the ability to gather information to perform their
constitutional functions without prying too far into the private affairs of
individuals. Kilbourn, Boyd, and In re Pacific Railway Commission, to-
gether with the rapid technological advancement that was taking place in
the late nineteenth century, would have a significant impact on what
those terms would be.
A. No Person Shall be Disturbed in his Private Affairs,
or His Home Invaded, Without Authority of Law
Before the Rights Committee could determine whether or not the
language of the Fourth Amendment should be incorporated into Wash-
ington's Declaration of Rights, it first had to determine what that lan-
guage meant. The most logical place for them to look was federal case
law interpreting the provision and Boyd, decided just three years prior to
the convention, was the first opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court that
offered an extended analysis of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 67 In
from the inspection and scrutiny of others. Without the enjoyment of this right, all other
rights would lose half their value.
Id. at 250.
65. Id. at 253-55, 258.
66. See, e.g., I.C.C. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
67. The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1897 (1980).
Fourth Amendment cases rarely reached the United States Supreme Court in the nineteenth century,
partly because Congress did not grant the Court jurisdiction to hear a criminal defendant's appeal
until 1891; Comment, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 952 n.42 (1977) (citing 26 Stat. 826, 827).
But see Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878) ("A federal statute banning lottery information from
the mail could not be enforced by federal officers opening letters and sealed packages, unless upon
the authority of a warrant. The right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable
searches and seizures extends to their papers wherever they may be."). The government could not
2008]
Seattle University Law Review
fact, there is convincing evidence that the Rights Committee, in selecting
the unique language of article I, section 7, intended to adopt the princi-
ples and conclusions set forth in the Boyd majority opinion while at-
tempting to remedy the Boyd majority's tenuous textual and historical
analysis of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
As Justice Miller's concurring opinion in Boyd suggests, the Boyd
majority's conclusions possibly reach farther than the Fourth Amend-
ment's text and history can support.68 For example, as Miller notes, it is
a stretch to conceptualize a mechanism, such as the one at issue in Boyd,
whereby a trial court, following a motion by a government attorney, or-
ders another party to a judicial proceeding to produce particular items or
papers relevant to the case that would be a "search" within the term's
traditional meaning.69 Furthermore, the text of the Fourth Amendment
prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizure and does not, as the
Boyd majority suggested, extend to governmental disturbances outside
that context.
By rejecting the Fourth Amendment's reference to "search and sei-
zure," and instead choosing the broad terms "disturbed" and "invaded"
for article I, section 7, the Rights Committee likely intended to incorpo-
rate the principle that the Boyd majority failed to persuasively establish:
that the provision applies against "all invasions on the part of the gov-
ernment ...of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of his
life.''70 The sheer breadth of the chosen word "disturbed" is perhaps the
most revealing clue as to the Rights Committee's intentions. At the time
of the framing, "disturbed" meant essentially what it means today, to "in-
terfere with" or "interrupt." 7' The Rights Committee's choice of "dis-
turbed" refutes any argument that article I, section 7 does not apply to the
compulsory production of incriminating documents before a governmen-
tal body, an argument which Miller's concurring opinion in Boyd indi-
cates the Fourth Amendment is susceptible to. 72 The Rights Committee's
appeal criminal cases until 1907. The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra, at
1897; Comment, supra, at 942 n.42.
68. See United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 638-41 (1886) (Miller, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 640-41 (Miller, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 629.
71. Compare WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 262 (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1913) with
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, disturb, available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/disturb
(last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
72. Boyd did not suggest that the compulsory production of documents would always be pre-
cluded by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Rather, the Boyd majority suggested that, in criminal
proceedings, compulsory production was limited to cases and under circumstances where the parties
might be compelled to produce books, writings, or other documents by the rules of proceeding in
chancery. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630-32 (citing Judiciary Act of 1789 § 15) ("[Olne cardinal rule of the
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choice of words precludes the possibility that a government entity in
Washington State can interfere with the private affairs of an individual
without the authority of law.
Similarly, the portion of article I, section 7 prohibiting the invasion
of one's home without authority of law was likely meant to emphasize
the "sanctity of a man's home," and the prohibition against any physical
intrusion into the home and its surrounding areas as opposed to merely
search or seizure.73 As the English high court noted in Entick, "every
invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. ' 74 The
legal maxim and popular proverb that "a man's house is his castle" had
wide application in the nineteenth century.75 In The General Principles
of Constitutional Law, Thomas Cooley described the meaning of that
proverb: "[E]very man under the protection of the laws may close the
door of his habitation, and defend his privacy in it, not against private
individuals merely, but against the officers of the law and the state itself,
against everything. '76  "[B]ut process issued upon a showing of legal
cause for invading it." 77 Official intrusions into the home were narrowly
restricted in the interest of privacy and the law erected high walls around
the family home and surrounding property by extending criminal penal-
ties and civil remedies for intrusions.78 Nineteenth century Americans
court of chancery is to never decree a discovery which might tend to convict the party of a crime, or
to forfeit his property."). Id. In Washington State, under article I, section 7, compulsory production
would be prohibited unless authorized by law, assuming, of course, such production does not violate
any other constitutional principle. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 7, 9.
73. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 629.
74. Id. at 627 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K. B.
1765)).
75. THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 365 (5th ed. 1883) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS]; JOEL P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 652 (1866); Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 67, at 1894
(citing BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 223) (The law has "so particular
and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house that it [considers] it his castle, and will never
suffer it to be violated with impunity")). The principal English authority for this maxim is Se-
mayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91 a, 77 Eng. Rep. 195, 196 (1605). Id.
76. THOMAS M. COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 210 (1880) [herein-
after GENERAL PRINCIPLES]. Cooley notes another "familiar" passage that embodies the common
law's protection of an individual's home against government intrusion:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may
be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain
may enter, but the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not cross the thresh-
old of the ruined tenement.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 75, at 365 n.4.
77. Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 208 (1874).
78. Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 67, at 1894. See Rem. & Bal.
Code of 1910 § 2821 - Forcible Entry and Detainer, enacted in 1854:
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were so protective of their homes that the courts and public were tolerant
of force, often deadly force, in the defense of their dwellings. 79 Thus, in
the nineteenth century, the common law provided heightened protection
for citizens' homes. By drafting article I, section 7 to prohibit the inva-
sion of an individual's home without authority of law, the Rights Com-
mittee likely intended to continue this tradition.
B. Private Affairs
While the state convention as a whole had been subject to criticism
for weighing down the constitution with provisions that might be consid-
ered legislative, a particular source of pride among the Rights Committee
was the concise provisions it drafted, which embraced only the ultimate
generalizations of political experience.8 ° It is tempting to dismiss the
Rights Committee's rejection of the Fourth Amendment's reference to
"persons ... papers, and effects" and its selection of "private affairs" as
merely an attempt to draft a more concise provision. However, the Com-
mittee had significant reasons for doing so. Due to rapid advances in
technology and an expanding governmental presence in peoples' lives,
the Rights Committee likely realized that far more than residents' "per-
sons... papers and effects" needed protection and therefore selected the
broader phrase "private affairs" for article I, section 7.
In July 1889, the delegates in the Rights Committee were not the
only people contemplating how to protect residents' privacy interests.
The American public was struggling to adapt to a rapidly changing
Every person who shall violently take or keep possession of any house or close with men-
aces, force, and arms, and without the authority of law, shall be deemed guilty of forcible
entry or forcible detainer, as the case may be, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined
in any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars.
Id.; § 2822 - Trespass upon [E]nclosed Lands, enacted in 1890:
If any person, other than an officer on lawful business, shall go or trespass upon any
[e]nclosed ands or premises not his own, and shall fail, neglect, or refuse to depart there-
from immediately... upon the verbal or printed or written notice of the owner or person
in lawful occupation of said lands, or premises, such trespass shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor....
Id.; see also Rem. & Bal. Code of 1910 § 2823-Trespass upon Un[e]enclosed Lands.
79. See CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 75, at 374 n.4.
[l]n defense of himself, any member of his family, or his dwelling, a man has a right to
employee all necessary violence, even to the taking of life .... But a man assaulted in his
dwelling is under no obligation to retreat; his house is his castle, which he may defend to
any extremity. And this means not simply the dwelling-house proper, but includes what-
ever is within the curtilage as understood at the common law.
Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 211.
80. Constitutions, WALLA WALLA WEEKLY STATESMAN, July 22, 1889, at 2, col. 1; see also
The Bill of Rights-Shortest Preamble in Existence Following the California Constitution, TACOMA
DAILY LEDGER, July 13, 1889, at 4, Cols. 1-4.
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society and consequently sought greater protection for their privacy in-
terests in both the courts and legislature. 81  The rapid advances in tech-
nology taking place in the late nineteenth century, such as the camera,
telegraph, and telephone created new methods for invading the private
affairs of individuals that were not explicitly protected by existing com-
mon law and statutory doctrines or by the Fourth Amendment. 82 For ex-
ample, in the late 1880s, libel doctrine did not provide protection against
the taking of photographs without the subject's knowledge and the sub-
sequent printing of the photos in newspapers.83 Furthermore, although
some states criminalized wiretapping and the disclosure of information
by communications operators, there was intense debate regarding
whether such statutes also prevented government investigators from de-
manding the production of telegrams.
84
In the public's opinion, however, government was also a significant
part of the problem. Individuals' private affairs increasingly found their
way into public records. For example, the scope of the United States
census gradually increased to encompass physical and mental defects,
national origin, literacy, diseases, and home mortgages. 85 The increasing
intrusiveness of these questions was greeted with a storm of public pro-
test, with Congress enacting a measure to protect the disclosure of such
information in 1889.86 "[T]he 'natural and inalienable right' of every-
body to keep his affairs to himself' was also asserted on behalf of the
public in opposition to other governmental recordkeeping for the federal
income tax and local records of land titles.87
81. Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 67, at 1892.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Herbert Spencer Hadley, The Right to Privacy, 3 Nw. U. L. REV. I
(1895) (Arguments in favor of the "right to privacy" are based on mistaken understanding of author-
ity and no such interest exists except to the extent a person may suffer injury with respect to his or
her property or some contractual relation).
83. Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 67, at 1909.
84. Id. at 1892, 1901.
85. Id. at 1904.
86. Id. at 1905 (citing Act of Mar. 1, 1889, ch. 319, §§ 8, 13, 25 Stat. 760).
87. Id. at 1906-07 (citing The Way It Ought Not to Be Collected, 9 Nation 453 (1869); Cong.
Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 2937 (remarks of Rep. Wood: "[l]nconsistent with the personal liberty
of the citizen," the tax "authorizes the assessor to intrude into the household, the private business
affairs, the domestic relationship of every individual"); Buck & Spencer v. Collins, 51 Ga. 391
(1874)). The increasingly aggressive tactics of the "yellow press" were also drawing scrutiny from
the public and legal academia. See, e.g, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890); A Laudatory Publication as a Cause of Action, 4 MICH. L. REV. 284, 285 (1905-1906);
Scandalmongers and Newspapers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1894, at 4. Even the delegates to the state
convention were not immune from attacks by the press, a fact that likely influenced the committee's
heightened concern for the "private affairs" of Washington's residents. On the morning of July 16,
1889, the last day it is known with any certainty that the language of proposed section 7 mirrored the
Fourth Amendment, Col. J.Z. Moore, a delegate from Spokane who had been accused of being a
2008]
Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 31:431
The historical context in which the state convention took place
suggests that the Rights Committee recognized that, in order to fully pro-
tect residents' privacy, they needed to use a general term that would not
only cover the tangible items listed in the Fourth Amendment, but also
one that would account for interests that were threatened by new tech-
nologies. The term "private affairs" was the natural choice. The term
was used by courts,88 government officials, 89 legal academics, 90 and the
press 91 in the nineteenth century to refer generally to the "affairs" of an
Northern Pacific Railroad lobbyist on the front page of the July 13, 1889, Seattle Times, arose to
address the Committee of the hole. Lobby Whiskey, SEATTLE TIMES, July 13, 1889, at 1, col. 2-3;
Mr. Moore Explains-The Whiskey Was for His Private Use, SEATTLE TIMES, July 17, 1889, at 1
col. 2-5. Lobby Whiskey, SEATTLE TIMES, July 13, 1889, at 1, col. 2-3. Moore had the article read
to the entire convention and then began a lengthy, blistering attack on the newspaper:
No man has a higher appreciation than myself of the greatness of the American press....
But... it (also) may oppress and distress.... It does this when it abandons the domain of
public transactions and invades the sanctity of private life and individual freedom. The
article just read ... is the result of a confessed espionage upon my private affairs ... it
bases a libel on it, and grossly charges me with being a railroad lobbyist.
Mr. Moore Explains-The Whiskey Was for His Private Use, supra, at I col. 2-5. Moore's passion-
ate speech before the convention was printed verbatim on the cover page of at least three major
newspapers in the Northwest. Id.; Mr. Moore Explains, SPOKANE FALLS REVIEW, July 17, 1889, at
1; Mr. Moore's Whiskey, THE MORNING OREGONIAN, July 17, 1889, at 1, col. 6. Moore's defense
from the "senseless attack of a Seattle newspaper . . . was listened to carefully, and applauded
roundly when completed"; it "created a sensation" at the convention "and made friends for the gen-
tleman." Mr. Moore's Statement, THE MORNING OREGONIAN, July 17, 1889, at 2, col. 3.
88. See, e.g., Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S 168, 190, 195 (1881); In re Pacific Railway
Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 250, 253 (N.D. Cal. 1887); In re Kearns, 64 F. 481, 483 (W.D. Pa. 1894); Long
v. Taxing Dist. of Shelby County, 75 Tenn. 134, 139 (1881). Thomas Cooley provided a suitable
definition of "private affairs" when he described the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment
outside the home:
It is justly assumed that every man may have secrets pertaining to his business, or his
family or social relations, to which his books, papers, letters, or journals may bear testi-
mony, but with which the public, or any individuals of the public who may have contro-
versies with him, can have no legitimate concern; and if they happen to be disgraceful to
him, they are nevertheless his secrets, and are not without justifiable occasion to be ex-
posed.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 210.
89. See, e.g., Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 67, at 1902 ("Oppo-
nents of congressional 'dragnet; subpoenas to telegraph offices invoked the 'rights of private citizens
to 'entrust their most sacredly private affairs to the telegraph company under the seal of its confi-
dence against 'the invasion of their privacy by their servants, the House of Representatives."'). Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
90. See, e.g., A Laudatory Publication as a Cause of Action, MICH. L. REV. 285, 287 (1905-
1906); Recent Case, 5 VA. L. REV. 710 (1899-1900) (formerly known as the Virginia Law Register).
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213 (1890).
91. See, e.g., Scandalmongers and Newspapers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1894 at 4; The Right to
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1889 at 4.
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individual in which "the community has no legitimate concern." 92 The
Boyd majority alluded to this right when it referred to the "indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property. 93 In-
deed, it was the Boyd's failure to persuasively argue that the text of the
Fourth Amendment protected these broad principles that likely led the
Committee to discard the language of that provision.
The Rights Committee recognized that the term "private affairs"
would encompass privacy interests threatened by future technological
developments. Contrary to the Fourth Amendment, which protects "per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects," article I, section 7 does not focus on
protecting the tangible items on which private matters might be recorded,
but on an individual's personal affairs themselves.94 Therefore, while the
federal courts were forced to give the Fourth Amendment's language an
expansive reading to encapsulate additional privacy interests,95 the
Rights Committee selected a term for article I, section 7 that would al-
ways provide broad textual support for the protection of an individual's
private affairs.
C. The Authority of Law
The most significant portion of article I, section 7, the phrase pro-
hibiting disturbances and invasions of residents' private affairs and
homes conducted "without authority of law," has been described by at
least one scholar as the most cryptic. 96 The Washington Supreme Court
has grappled with the meaning of this phrase on only a handful of occa-
sions.97 Although the court has recognized that such authority may be
92. Equity: Right of Privacy: Injunction to Protect Personal Rights, 5 CORNELL L. REV. 177
(1919-1920) (formerly known as the Cornell Law Quarterly).
93. United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886).
94. Compare WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 with U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also State v. Myrick,
102 Wash. 2d 506, 513, 688 P.2d 151 (1984) ("In contrast [to the Fourth Amendment], the language
of WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 7 precludes a 'protected places' analysis and mandates protection of the
person in his private affairs.").
95. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967).
96. John Leshy referring to article II, section 8 of the Arizona Constitution, which was taken
verbatim from article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. JOHN D. LESHY, THE
ARIZONA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 45 (1993).
97. See State v. Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d 343, 352 n.3, 979 P.2d 833, 839 n.3 (1999) ("statutory
authorization" references a statute authorizing a court to issue a warrant, not a statute dispensing
with the warrant requirement); see also City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 274, 868
P.2d 134, 141 (1994); State v. Salinas, 119 Wash. 2d 192, 202-03, 829 P.2d 1068, 1074 (1992);
State v. Fields, 85 Wash. 2d 126, 130-33, 530 P.2d 284, 286-88 (1975) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
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provided by a statute or the common law,98 it has done so without exam-
ining the Rights Committee's rationale for choosing the specific lan-
guage in article I, section 7. As a result, the court has provided only a
partial explanation as to the meaning of the phrase "without authority of
law" and occasional disputes over the meaning of this phrase still arise.99
Because they likely envisioned such disputes, the framers were careful to
remind future generations that "[a] frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles is essential to the security of individual right and the perpetu-
ity of free government."100
If the influence of the "compulsory production" cases on the Rights
Committee is recognized, then it is possible to draw two conclusions
about the phrase authority of law. First, the "law" referred to in article I,
section 7 likely means either a statutory provision or common law prin-
ciple. The Boyd majority opinion, quoting Entick v. Carrington, ex-
pressly articulated this proposition:
If he (the government trespasser) admits the fact, he is bound to
show... some positive law has justified or excused him. The justi-
fication is submitted to the judges, who are to look into the books,
and see if such a justification can be maintained by the text of the
statute law, or by the principles of the common law. 1
This quotation articulates an old principle: the greatest threat to privacy
from the government is officials doing their jobs according to their own
ideas of how to proceed and that privacy is best safeguarded by adher-
ence to precise and predetermined legal principles. 
102
98. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 68, 720 P.2d 808, 816 (1986) ("The 'authority of law'
required by WASH. CONST. art. 1, §7 ... includes authority granted by a valid, (i.e., constitutional)
statute or the common law.").
99. See, e.g., Ladson, 138 Wash. 2d at 352 n.3, 979 P.2d at 839 n.3. The Ladson majority
vehemently rejected the dissent's contention that a statute can supply the requisite "authority of law"
in place of a warrant.
100. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32.
101. United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 How.
St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K. B. 1765)) (emphasis added). See also WILLIAM CLARK,
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 39 (1895) ("[I]t is well settled that the [Fourth Amendment]
does not apply to reasonable arrests without a warrant, authorized either by the common law or by
statute.").
102. George R. Nock, Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7, 8 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 331, 347 (1984-1985). Professor Nock actually quoted a passage from P.
POLYVIOU, SEARCH & SEIZURE 9 (1982), which summarizes the principles articulated in Entick v.
Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765). This same passage was quoted in State v. Ringer, 100
Wash. 2d 686, 691, 674 P.2d at 1240 (1983). Thomas Cooley observed in 1883 that "[i]f in the
English history we inquire into the original occasion for [the Fourth Amendment], we shall probably
find it in the abuse of executive authority, and in the unwarrantable intrusion of executive agents into
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Of course, as Professor George Nock observed in his 1984 article,
Seizing Opportunity, Searching for Theory: Article I, Section 7, "[a]fter
seventy years of judicial creation of search-and-seizure law from consti-
tutional principles, the idea of entrusting privacy protection to the politi-
cal process sounds both radical and naive."'10 3  In fact, Washington
State's own history demonstrates that both the judiciary and legislature
have, at times, been responsible for the erosion of privacy laws and, at
others, for strengthening them. For example, as the Washington Su-
preme Court candidly documented in State v. Ringer, its early decisions
engaged in a steady expansion of law enforcement's search and seizure
power far beyond "historic foundation"10 4 before it began to broaden the
protections afforded by article I, section 7 in the early 1980s. 0 5 For its
part, in 1969, the legislature began to expand the number of misdemean-
ors for which law enforcement officers can make warrantless arrests
based on probable cause.10 6 However, the legislature also enacted a stat-
ute making it a crime for police officers to search a private residence
without a search warrant.' 07 More recently, the legislature enacted stat-
utes providing broader protection than required under state or federal
case law in the areas of electronic eavesdropping and unauthorized voice
recording.
10 8
By entrusting both the courts and legislature to provide the "law"
authorizing disturbances of residents' private affairs, the Rights Commit-
tee not only followed long-standing precedent, it also ensured that each
branch of government would serve as a check on the other. Moreover,
the Rights Committee drafted article I, section 7 in the middle of an era
the houses and among the private papers of individuals .. " CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra
note 75, at 365-66.
103. Nock, supra note 102, at 347.
104. Id. at 348 (citing State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 692-96, 674 P.2d 1240, 1244-46
(1983)).
105. See State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151, 153 (1984); State v. Chrisman,
100 Wash. 2d 814, 818, 676 P.2d 419, 422 (1984); State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d
1240 (1983); State v. White, 97 Wash. 2d 92, 640 P.2d 1061 (1982); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d
170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980)).
106. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.31.100 (2006). This statute has been amended at least 20
times since 1969 and has been expanded to include 24 exceptions, including underage drinking,
driving under the influence, violations of protection orders, and situations involving domestic vio-
lence. State v. Walker, 157 Wash. 2d 307, 318, 138 P.3d 113, 119 (2006).
107. Laws of 1921, ch. 71, §§ 1-2.
108. Nock, supra note 1032, at 348 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.030, which makes
unlawful the recording of any communication over telephone or radio between two or more indi-
viduals, or of any private conversation, without first obtaining the consent of the individuals in-
volved. The statute provides exceptions for news-gathering employees who have prior consent, or
who make the recording device obvious and for calls of an emergency nature, such as the reporting
of a fire, crime, or other disaster.).
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of fervent populism10 9 and the framers guaranteed that both the courts
and legislature would remain directly accountable to the people by pro-
viding for the popular election of legislators 10° and judges."1 In this
manner, the courts, legislature, and the people all serve to ensure resi-
dents' private affairs receive sufficient protection.
The second conclusion that can be drawn from the compulsory pro-
duction cases, particularly Boyd, is that, except for in a few very specific
situations, "authority of law" meant a government disturbance or inva-
sion conducted pursuant to a valid warrant or subpoena issued by a neu-
tral magistrate or other authorized government entity. 1 2  According to
Cooley's influential treatise, Constitutional Limitations,"1 3 the second
clause of the Fourth Amendment, which lists the requirements for a con-
stitutionally valid search warrant, "sufficiently indicates the circum-
stances under which a reasonable search and seizure may be made.'
1 4
First and foremost, Cooley explained, search warrants are "only to be
granted in the cases expressly authorized by law."' 15  This means that
there must be (1) a law which shall point out the circumstances and con-
ditions under which the warrant may be granted, (2) a court or magistrate
109. Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat'l Democratic Policy Comm'n., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 445,
780 P.2d 1282 (Utter, J., concurring) (By 1889, a wave of populism lapped against the shores of
Olympia as the constitution was drafted).
110. WASH. CONST. art. II, §§ 5-6.
111.Id. art. IV, §§3,5.
112. See GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 209-13; CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,
supra note 75, at 365-74; BISHOP, supra note 75, §§ 613-669.
113. See United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 625, 629 (1886) (citing CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, supra note 75, at 368-69). Around the time of the framing, the Territorial and State
Supreme Court also cited to Cooley's CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS as persuasive authority. See
e.g., Lim v. Territory of Washington, 1 Wash. 156, 160, 24 P. 588, 588 (1890); Owsley v. Oregon R.
& N. Co., I Wash. 491,494-95, 20 P. 782, 783-84 (1889); Harland v. Territory of Washington, 3
Wash. Terr. 131, 144-46, 13 P. 453,458 (1887).
114. GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 210. But see CLARK, supra note 101, at 39 ("It
has been contended that [the Fourth Amendment] renders all arrests unlawful except upon a warrant
so issued; but it is well settled that the provision does not apply to 'reasonable arrests without a
warrant, authorized either by the common law or by statute."').
115. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 75, at 369 (emphasis added). The Boyd ma-
jority also interpreted the Fourth Amendment to mean that those searches and seizures that were
authorized by either the common or statutory law were "reasonable." See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 622-24.
At the time, search warrants were commonly allowed to search for and seize stolen goods, goods
smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws, implements of gaming or counterfeiting,
lottery tickets, prohibited liquors, prohibited books and papers, and for powder or other explosive
and dangerous material. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 75, at 372. Search warrants
were also occasionally provided for by statute for books and papers of a public character, retained
from their proper custody; females supposed to be concealed in houses of ill-fame; children enticed
kept away from parents or guardians; concealed weapons; counterfeit money, and forged bills or
papers. Id. at 372 n.l.
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empowered by the law to grant it, and (3) an officer to whom it may be
issued for service. 16  Furthermore, Cooley noted a particularized de-
scription of the place to be searched and persons or items to be seized
and probable cause must be demonstrated to a court or magistrate."1
7
Washington State and Territorial law around the time of the fram-
ing are in accord with Boyd and Cooley. The territorial and state
legislatures passed specific acts pointing out the circumstances under
which a warrant may be granted. For example, acts were passed author-
izing warrants to issue, to search for, and to seize property that had been
stolen, embezzled, or obtained by false pretence;" 18 counterfeit or spuri-
ous coin, forged instruments, or tools, machines, or materials prepared or
provided for making them; 119 any unlawful gaming apparatus; 120 for
fowls, birds, dogs, or other animals used or preparing to be used for
fighting exhibitions,' 21 and for the arrest of a defendant for whom an in-
dictment was found or an information filed. 2 2 In addition, the legislature
authorized magistrates to issue such warrants,2 3 upon "reasonable" or
"good" cause, 124 and sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constables, and police offi-
cers to execute them.
125
Of course, in certain circumstances, warrantless arrests were also
authorized by statute or the common law at the time of the framing,
though there was disagreement among American jurisdictions and
116. GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 210.
117. Id.
118. See Bal. Code § 7010; Code of 1881 § 967.
119. Bal. Code § 7011(1); Code of 1881 § 968(1); Laws of 1854, p. 100, § 1.
120. Bal. Code § 7011(2); Code of 1881 § 968(2); Laws of 1854, p. 101, § 2.
121. Bal. Code § 7404; Laws of 1893, ch. 27, § 5.
122. Bal. Code § 6865; see also Laws of 1891, p. 54, § 41.
123. A "magistrate" was defined as "an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of
a person charged with the commission of a crime." Bal. Code § 4690; Laws of 1891, p. 91, § 1. The
following officers were magistrates: the justices of the supreme court, superiorjudges, justices of the
peace, and all municipal officers authorized to exercise the powers and perform the duties of a jus-
tice ofthe peace. Bal. Code § 4691; Laws of 1891, p. 91, § 2.
124. Some early State and Territorial statutes referred to "reasonable" or "good" cause instead
of probable cause. See, e.g., Bal. Code § 7011(1); Bal. Code § 7404. Cooley used the terms "rea-
sonable cause" and "reasonable cause for suspicion" in his treatises as interchangeable with "prob-
able cause." See CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 75, at 369. A number of terms were
used in the late nineteenth century to describe the standard for the issuance of a search warrant or for
an arrest were considered to be interchangeable with "probable" cause. See, e.g., FRANCIS
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE, §§ 5, 8-9 (8th ed. 1880) ("reason-
able ground" and "reasonable ground of suspicion" are "convertible" with "probable cause");
BISHOP, supra note 75, §§ 638-39 (1866) ("reasonable and proper cause" and "reasonable suspi-
cion").
125. See Bal. Code § 507 (Among sheriffs' duties was to "execute all warrants delivered to
him for that purpose by other public officers, according to the provisions of particular statutes"); see
also Laws of 1893, ch. 27, § 5.
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commentators on the extent of that authority. 126 At the very least, it was
well-settled that the common law authorized law enforcement officers to
conduct a warrantless arrest (1) for a felony or a misdemeanor amounting
to a "breach of the peace" 127 committed in his presence; 128 (2) based on
"probable" or "reasonable" cause that a felony has been committed; 129
and, (3) according to some scholars, on probable cause to believe a
breach of the peace offense has been committed. 130  In addition, some
scholars observed that the common law authorized officers to make a
warrantless arrest for any offense committed in their presence, including
misdemeanors, while others contended that this power must be granted
by statute.131 Washington courts followed the former approach.
132
126. CLARK, supra note 101, at 38-46; WHARTON, supra note 124, §§ 8-17; BISHOP, supra
note 75, §§ 621-643. See also GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra 76, at 213. The party who conducted a
warrantless arrest had the burden of justifying it: "whoever makes one must show that the excep-
tional case existed which would justify it." Id. at 213.
127. CLARK, supra note 101, at 40-41. As Clark notes, "breach of the peace" was a generic
term used to describe a variety of offenses:
It must be remembered that fighting, rioting, etc., is not necessary to constitute a breach
of the peace. A breach of the peace is 'a violation of public order-the offense of dis-
turbing the public peace. An act of public indecorum is also a breach of the peace. The
term 'breach of the peace' is generic, and includes riotous and unlawful assemblies, riots
affray, forcible entry and detainer, the wanton discharge of firearms so near the chamber
of a sick person as to cause injury, the sending of challenges and provoking to fight, go-
ing armed in public without lawful occasion in such manner as to alarm the public, and
many other acts of a similar character.
Id.
128. Id.; GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 213; BISHOP, supra note 75, §§ 627, 640.
129. CLARK, supra note 101, at 41-42; GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 213. BISHOP,
supra note 75, §§ 625, 638, 640.
130. WHARTON, supra note 124, §§ 8-9; (For a past offense, the power to conduct a war-
rantless arrest is limited to cases of felony and breaches of the peace.); see also SAMUEL MAXWELL,
A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11 (1896). A peace officer could also make
arrests without warrant when municipal by-laws were violated in his presence. GENERAL
PRINCIPLES, supra note 76, at 213.
131. Compare CLARK, supra note 101, at 43, 43 n.101 (1895) ("At common law, the right of
an officer to arrest on another's accusation, or on his own suspicion only, is limited to cases of fel-
ony; the statutes of many states allow an officer to arrest without a warrant for any public offense
committed in his presence, including misdemeanors.") with WHARTON, supra note 124, §§ 8-9
("[F]or all offenses committed in the presence of an officer, the power to arrest the offender ex-
ists."). Bishop also indicated that a warrantless arrest could be made for certain low grade offenses
committed in an individual's presence: "[a]n arrest of an offender by a private person, for any crime
prejudicial to the public, seems to be justifiable." BISHOP, supra note 75, §§ 626, 630. Bishop cited
as an example that,
[a]ny private person may arrest a common notorious cheat, going about in the country
with false dice, and being actually caught playing with them.... [R]estraining the private
persons from arresting them without a warrant from a magistrate would be consequently
prejudicial, because it would give them an opportunity of escaping, and continuing their
offenses without punishment.
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The right of law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless arrests
was either defined or enlarged by statute in many jurisdictions at the time
of the framing; 133 in most instances, this meant statutes authorizing war-
rantless arrests for (1) breach of the peace offenses after they have been
committed; 134 and (2) misdemeanors other than breaches of the peace,
committed in an officer's presence. 135 In a few states, there were statutes
allowing arrests without a warrant for certain misdemeanors on informa-
tion received from others. 136 In Washington, for instance, the legislature
passed an 1893 act authorizing officers to conduct misdemeanor arrests
of persons found engaged in the abuse of children, animals, fowl, or
birds or upon oral complaint by any officer or member of a humane soci-
ety or society for the prevention of cruelty to animals. 1
37
Warrantless searches and seizures were also tolerated in the late
nineteenth century, usually by virtue of the common law. 138 In the late
nineteenth century, courts allowed warrantless searches of the person of
an arrestee when incident to lawful arrest. 139  However, the exception
was limited to personal property found in the possession of a person
when he was arrested and that (1) was apparently used in the commission
of the crime; (2) was obtained by the crime; (3) could be used to commit
violence or effect an escape; or (4) could used as evidence against the
accused. 140 The arresting officer could not confiscate money unless there
BISHOP, supra note 75, § 626; see also BISHOP, supra note 75, § 630 ("Whenever the circumstances
of a case would justify a private person in making an arrest without a warrant, they will equally
justify a constable, sheriff, or watchman.").
132. State v. Llewellyn, 119 Wash. 306, 310, 205 P. 394, 396 (1922) ("Arrests for misde-
meanor may be lawfully made without a warrant when the offense is committed in the presence of
the arresting officer.")
133. CLARK, supra note 101, at 39; BISHOP, supra note 75, § 641.
134. See CLARK, supra note 101, at 42-43.
135. Id. at 40 n.88, 43, 43 n.101-02; BISHOP, supra note 75, § 641 n.1; JOSEPH BEALE, JR., A
TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 21 (1899) ("By statute the power of peace
officers to arrest without a warrant is often extended to all misdemeanors committed in their pres-
ence. Such statutes do not permit an arrest for a misdemeanor not actually committed in the presence
of the officer.").
136. CLARK, supra note 102, at 43 n.101; (citing Jacobs v. State, 12 S.W. 408 (1889); Exparte
Sherwood, 15 S.W. 812 (1890)).
137. Laws of 1893, ch. XXVII, § 1, 2, 8, 9; compare Laws of 1893, ch. XXVII, § 9 with
WHARTON, supra note 124, § 8 ("cruelty to an animal, though a statutory misdemeanor, is not such
an offense as authorizes arrest without a warrant.").
138. BISHOP, supra note 75, §§ 651-64.
139. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 691-92, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243-44 (1983) (citing
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); State ex. rel. Murphy v. Brown, 83 Wash. 100, 105-
06, 145 P. 69, 71 (1914); Dillon v. O'Brien, 20 L.R. Ir. 200, 316-17 (Ex. D. 1887); Leigh v. Cole, 6
Cox Crim. L. Cas. 329, 332 (Oxford Cir. 1853)); see also BISHOP, supra note 75, §§ 667-69 (1866);
CLARK, supra note 101, at 71.
140. CLARK, supra note 101, at 71; BISHOP, supra note 75, §§ 667-69.
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was reason to believe it was connected with the supposed crime as its
fruits or as the instruments with which the crime was committed.
1 4'
The common law authorized officers to enter a home (1) occupied
by an accused, provided there was probable ground to believe the
accused was there, to conduct a lawful arrest; and (2) when there was an
affray or breach of the peace in the home. 142 Several additional excep-
tions to the warrant requirement existed that were similar to their modem
counterparts, including hot pursuit, 43 the emergency exception, 144 and
the plain view exception. 145
Finally, it is critical to note that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, the
protection afforded by article I, section 7 is not limited to preventing
search or seizure conducted without the authority of law. Article I, sec-
tion 7 also prevents legislative bodies from asserting "the general power
of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen,"1 46 while at the
same time granting them the ability to get the information they need to
fulfill their constitutional functions. Indeed, while the Rights Committee
might have recognized that Kilbourn and In re Pacific Railway Commis-
sion will "stand for all time as a bulwark against the invasion of the right
141. CLARK, supra note 101, at 71 ("To take away the party's money in such cases is to de-
prive him of the lawful means of defense."); BISHOP, supra note 75, § 669 (internal quotations omit-
ted).
142. See CLARK, supra note 101, at 53-54. The officer need not have seen the felony commit-
ted; he may act on information from someone else who did see it. Id. at 54. In misdemeanor cases
other than breach of the peace, such as where unlawful gaming is going on in a house or intoxicating
liquors are being sold in violation of the law, an officer cannot break open the door and enter a home
without a warrant. Id. at 54. See also WHARTON, supra note 124, §§ 18-20.
143. GENERAL PRINCIPLES, supra note 77, at 211:
When it is certain that a treason or felony has been committed, or a dangerous wound
given, and the offender being pursued takes refuge in his own house or the house of an-
other, the doors of the dwelling may be forced for the purpose of arresting the person if
that person known to be therein after a proper demand of admittance has been refused.
Id.; see also BISHOP, supra note 75, §§ 652, 660.
144. "Upon a violent cry of murder in a house, any person may break open the door to prevent
the commission of a felony, and may restrain the party threatening, till he appears to have changed
this purpose." BISHOP, supra note 75, § 660. "When an affray is made in a house, in the view or
hearing of a constable, he may break open the outdoor in order to suppress it." Id. §§ 652, 660. "In
all cases it is absolutely necessary that a demand of admittance should be made, and be refused
before outer doors may be broken." Id. § 660.
145. State v. Llewellyn, 119 Wash. 306, 309-10, 205 P. 394, 395-96 (1922) (Where officers
lawfully entered a saloon open to the general public and observed the defendant unlawfully dispos-
ing of intoxicating liquor, their entry, seizure of the articles, and arrest of the defendant were lawful.
"Once in the place, the officers were justified in taking cognizance of the fact that a crime was being
committed by the defendant. The evidence thereof was before their very eyes; it took no search to
find it.").
146. Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S 168, 190 (1881).
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of the citizen to protection in his private affairs," 147 those cases were also
potentially a significant hindrance on the legislature's ability to gather
information. Just eight years after the state convention, the U.S. Su-
preme Court would note the "difficulties under which the two Houses
have labored, respectively, in compelling witnesses to disclose facts
deemed essential to taking definitive action.'
1 48
By authorizing disturbances with authority of law, the Rights Com-
mittee provided the state legislature with the ability to authorize the com-
mittees of either house to require witnesses to testify and to produce
documents necessary for the legislative branch to fulfill its constitutional
functions. Immediately following the framing, the legislature started
doing just that with an 1895 statute providing for the taking of testimony
in legislative proceedings and the compulsory production of pertinent
documents; that statute is still in effect.
149
At the time of the state convention in 1889, it must have seemed
doubtful to the Rights Committee whether such a statute would withstand
scrutiny under the limits on the legislature's ability to compel testimony
and the production of documents established in Kilbourn and In re Pa-
cific Railway Commission's. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court would not
find a similar federal statute constitutional until eight years after the state
convention. 50 By authorizing the legislature to provide the requisite au-
thority of law, the Rights Committee ensured that the legislative branch
would be able to get the information it needed and helped Washington's
courts avoid the confusion over the issue of legislative and judicial com-
pulsory production that the federal courts experienced. 1
5 1
147. In re Pacific Railway Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 253 (N.D. Cal. 1887).
148. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
149. Laws of 1895, ch. 6, §§ 1-17 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 44.16.010-. 170 (2006)):
Sec. 1. Every chairman or presiding member of any committee of either the senate or
house of representatives, or any joint committee ... which, by the terms of its appoint-
ment, shall be authorized to send for persons and papers, shall have power, under the di-
rection of such committee, to issue compulsory process for the attendance of any witness
within the state whom the committee may wish to examine.
Sec. 11. A person who, being duly summoned to attend as a witness before either house
of the legislature or, or any committee joint committee thereof, refused or neglects, with-
out lawful excuse, to attend.. .shall be punished as for contempt....
Sec. 12. A person who, refuses to be sworn or affirmed ... or to produce ... any mate-
rial and proper books, papers, and documents, in his possession or under his control, shall
be punished as for contempt. ...
Id.
150. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1897).
151. See, e.g., id.; I.C.C. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894); United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S.
616 (1886); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S 168 (1881); In re Pac. Railway Comm'n, 32 F. 241
(N.D. Cal. 1887). See also Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass. 118 (1876).
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At the same time, the Rights Committee wisely ensured that any
disturbance of a resident's private affairs could only be authorized by the
common law or by statute, as opposed to the order at issue in Kilbourn,
which was made only by House resolution.'5 2 The Rights Committee
also likely realized that, in passing any law authorizing a disturbance of
an individual's private affairs for the purpose of a legislative
investigation, the legislature would be constitutionally limited to inquir-
ing into only those matters sufficient to discharge its legitimate func-
tions. 53 Finally, the simple phrase "without authority of law," is a short,
simple, and clear statement of the principle the Rights Committee meant
to articulate.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE UNIQUE
LANGUAGE IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
A. Washington's Constitutionally Mandated Exclusionary Rule
The most striking implication resulting from the Rights Commit-
tee's reliance on compulsory production cases in drafting article I, sec-
tion 7 is a constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule. The origin of
Washington's independent exclusionary rule has already been well
documented in Sanford Pitler's article, The Origin Development of
Washington's Independent Exclusionary Rule: Constitutional Right and
Constitutionally Compelled Remedy. 154 Pitler describes how, under the
"convergence" theory, 55 first articulated in Boyd and applied by the
State Supreme Court in State v. Gibbons, 56 the right of an individual not
to give real or physical evidence against themselves in a criminal prose-
cution under article I, section 9 mandates exclusion from all criminal
proceedings evidence that law enforcement obtained in violation of arti-
cle I, section 7.I57 Pitler's article is worthy of further discussion, but
first, a brief explanation of convergence theory is in order.
152. Kilbourn, 103 U.S 168.
153. See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. at 671-72; Robinson v. Fluent, 30 Wash. 2d 194, 202, 191
P.2d 241, 245 (1948).
154. Pitler, supra note 46.
155. The term "convergence" theory has been used by the U.S. Supreme Court and academics
to describe Boyd's theory about the relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in the
search and seizure context. Id. at 522-23; see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 473 n.6
(1976).
156. 118 Wash. 171,203 P. 390(1922).
157. See Pitler, supra note 46, at 515-25 (citing State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 184-88, 203
P. 390, 395-96 (1922)).
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Convergence theory, which was a creation of the Boyd majority,
postulated that in the context of search and seizure, the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments "run almost into each other":
For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the
Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of com-
pelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal
cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man
"in criminal cases to be a witness against himself," which is
condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as
to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning
of the Fourth. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure
of a man's books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against
himself.'58
The Boyd majority believed that any evidence obtained as a result of an
unreasonable search or seizure was functionally the same as compelling
that person to give evidence or be a witness against himself. 59 Because
a person could not be compelled to testify or give physical evidence
against himself, the Boyd majority concluded, admission of unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence in any criminal proceeding was "erroneous
and unconstitutional. '' 6 °
Of course, Boyd's sweeping interpretation of the Fifth Amend-
ment's text does not withstand a critical analysis, and subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions have limited the scope of the Fifth Amendment
and overruled Boyd's convergence theory.' 61 But this does not change
the significant affect Boyd had on the intent of the Rights Committee in
1889. Looking to Boyd, the Committee explicitly rejected the Fifth
Amendment's language, "nor shall (any person) be compelled in any
158. United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) (emphasis added).
159. Id. at 630, 633.
160. Id. at 638. The Boyd majority reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court and remanded
the case with directions to award a new trial. Id.
161. See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); see also Pitler, supra note 46, at 517 n.308
(citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (Fifth amendment privilege covers compulsion
of testimonial or communicative evidence only, not real or physical evidence, and therefore compul-
sory blood alcohol level tests do not violate the Fifth amendment); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 397 (1976) (Fifth Amendment protects person asserting privilege only from compelled self-
incrimination and consequently the contents of business records are not privileged because they are
created voluntarily without compulsion); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 472 (1976) (the
continued validity of the broad statements contained in [Boyd] has been discredited by later opin-
ions); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Boyd convergence
theory is dead; the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private
papers of any kind)).
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criminal case to be a witness against himself... ," in favor of the lan-
guage currently found in article I, section 9, "[n]o person shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself.... ,,162
Pitler suggests that the Rights Committee took the "give evidence"
language in article I, section 9 directly from the Boyd majority's discus-
sion of convergence. 163 But it is also likely that the Committee followed
the search and seizure section of Thomas Cooley's treatise, Constitu-
tional Limitations,164 which was relied upon by the Boyd majority. Coo-
ley observed that a search warrant could not be issued to "invade one's
privacy for the sole purpose of obtaining evidence against him, except in
a few special cases where that which is the subject of the crime is sup-
posed to be concealed, and the public or the complainant has an interest
in it or in its destruction":
165
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
found also in many State constitutions, would clearly preclude the
seizure of one's papers in order to obtain evidence against him; and
the spirit of the fifth amendment-that no person shall be com-
pelled in a criminal case to give evidence against himself-would
also forbid such seizure.'
66
Thus, Cooley, like the Boyd majority, saw the seizure of evidence ob-
tained without either a search warrant authorized by statute or any type
of probable or reasonable cause that contraband was located at a sus-
pected location as functionally identical to compelling a person to give
evidence against himself in violation of the spirit of the Fifth Amend-
ment. The fact that the Rights Committee adopted the italicized portion
of Cooley's proposition almost verbatim in article I, section 9 suggests
that they intended for the article to prohibit such seizures.
A second topic from Pitler's article that is worthy of further analy-
sis is the Washington Supreme Court's initial refusal to fully accept the
162. JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 498; ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH D. SPITZER, THE
WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION-A REFERENCE GUIDE 23 (2002). Despite this evidence, the
State Supreme Court has interpreted the two provisions as providing identical protections. State v.
Easter, 130 Wash. 2d 228, 235, 922 P.2d 1285, 1289 (1996); State v. Earls, 116 Wash. 2d 364, 374-
75, 805 P.2d 211, 216 (1991); State v. Foster, 91 Wash. 2d 466, 473, 589 P.2d 789, 794-95 (1979);
State v. Moore, 79 Wash. 2d 51, 55-56,483 P.2d 630, 633-34 (1971).
163. Pitler, supra note 46, at 519.
164. United States v. Boyd, 116 U.S. 616, 629 (1886) (citing CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS,
supra note 75, at 365).
165. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 75, at 371. Cooley then goes on to list the
purposes for which search warrants were typically authorized by statute or the common law, for
example, to search for stolen goods, implements of gaming or counterfeiting, prohibited liquors, etc.
Id. at 372.
166. Id. at 371 n.5 (emphasis added). Compare id. with WASH. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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Boyd convergence theory. 167 In the 1905 case of State v. Royce, a police
detective acting on his own suspicions that Royce had stolen a type-
writer, arrested Royce, took him to the police station and searched him,
discovering a pawn ticket for the typewriter. 168  A few days later, the
typewriter was reported stolen and the State charged Royce with
burglary. 69  At trial, the State admitted the pawn ticket over Royce's
objection, and he was subsequently convicted.17
0
Royce appealed his conviction to the Washington Supreme Court
and, relying on Boyd, argued that by taking the pawn ticket from his per-
son, his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was vio-
lated, thereby compelling him to produce testimony against himself' 
71
The court rejected that argument, citing State v. Nordstrom72 and State v.
Burns,173 two cases in which the searches at issue took place after the
defendants had been lawfully arrested. 74 The court observed that, "in a
criminal action, articles, personal effects, or money, taken from the per-
son of a defendant, might be offered in evidence against him."' 75 With-
out acknowledging article I, sections 7 or 9, the court relied upon several
167. See State v. Royce, 38 Wash. 11, 116-18, 80 P. 268, 270-71 (1905); Pitler, supra note
46, at 467.
168. Royce, 38 Wash. at 112-13, 80 P. 268 at 269.
169. Id. at 113, 80 P. 268 at 269.
170. Id. at 112, 114, 116, 80 P. 268 at 268-70.
171. Id. at 116, 80 P. 268 at 270.
172. 7 Wash. 507, 35 P. 382 (1893). As further evidence Washington's residents believed that
article I, sections 7 and 9 embodied the Boyd convergence theory is that, in this case, decided just
four years after the framing, the appellant framed his argument in the form of the Boyd convergence
theory: "Appellant complains of the admission of the boots and socks in evidence on the ground that
they were obtained by an unreasonable search of his person, and that it was a method of compelling
him to give evidence against himself." Id. at 509-10. The court rejected the appellant's argument
because "it has never been held that personal effects of every kind could not be taken from the per-
son of a prisoner and used upon his trial for what they may be worth as criminating evidence." Id. at
510 (emphasis added). In other words, the argument failed because the search of the appellant fol-
lowing his arrest was lawful and, therefore, did not violate article 1, section 7. Id.
173. 19 Wash. 52, 52 P. 316 (1898).
174. See Nordstrom, 7 Wash. at 509, 35 P. at 383 ("These articles were taken from appellant's
person upon his arrest and were retained by the sheriff to be used as evidence; the boots because it
was claimed that they fitted the tracks, and the socks because they were muddy. No force whatever
seems to have been used by the officers in getting possession of these things, but they were taken
from the prisoner in the course of the usual search of his person, upon his arrival at the jail."); see
also Burns, 19 Wash. at 55, 52 P. at 317. Another noteworthy aspect of the Nordstrom case is that,
shortly after the framing, Nordstrom, like Royce, framed his argument in the form of Boyd's conver-
gence theory. See Nordstrom, 7 Wash. at 509-10, 35 P. at 384 ("Appellant complains of the admis-
sion of the boots and socks in evidence on the ground that they were obtained by an unreasonable
search of his person, and that it was a method of compelling him to give evidence against himself...
. 17).
. 175. State v. Royce, 38 Wash. 111, 116, 80 P. 268, 270 (1905).
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out-of-state cases to distinguish Boyd on the facts. 176 In Boyd, the court
argued that the trial court compelled the claimants to produce the evi-
dence against themselves, while in Royce, "the courts exercised no com-
pulsion whatsoever to procure evidence from the defendants." '77 The
court then affirmed the common law rule regarding illegally obtained
evidence: "Though papers and other subjects of evidence may have been
illegally taken from the possession of the party against whom they are
offered, or otherwise unlawfully obtained, this is no valid objection to
their admissibility, if they are pertinent to the issue." 178
The Royce court's reluctance to apply the Boyd convergence theory
is almost forgivable. As Pitler notes, at the time the Royce opinion was
rendered, the Boyd decision faced widespread criticism: other state su-
preme courts almost universally rejected the Boyd convergence theory.179
Furthermore, just one year prior to Royce, in Adams v. New York, 180 the
United States Supreme Court, consisting of almost an entirely new mem-
bership, 181 essentially repudiated Boyd by (1) declaring that the "weight
of authority as well as reason" supported the common law rule; 182 (2)
limiting Boyd to instances where a court specifically ordered the defen-
dant to affirmatively produce evidence; 183 and (3) noting that the Fifth
Amendment's protection was limited to protecting a criminal defendant
from testifying against himself. 1
84
It would be another seventeen years before the Washington Su-
preme Court would again directly address the Boyd convergence the-
ory. 185 By that time, much had changed. Prohibition, at both the state
and federal level, significantly increased the amount of contact law
176. Id. at 116-17, 80 P. 268 at 270.
177. Id. at 117, 80 P. 268 at 270 (quoting Gindrat v. People, 138 I11. 103, 111 (1891)).
178. Id., 80 P. 268 at 270; see also Gindrat, 138 111. at 111 (quoting 1 GREENLEAF ON
EVIDENCE § 254a (Redfield's ed.)).
179. See Pitler, supra note 46, at 467 (citing 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264 (2d ed. 1923)).
Prior to 1914, at least two state courts adopted the Boyd rule and rejected the common law rule. See
Pitler, supra note 46, at 467 n.45 (citing State v. Slamon, 50 A. 1097, 1098 (1901) (convergence
theory invoked to suppress letter seized during search pursuant to warrant authorizing search for
stolen goods)); State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730, 731 (1903) (allowing a defendant to be convicted on
illegally seized evidence would "emasculate the constitutional guaranty, and deprive it of all benefi-
cial force or effect in preventing unreasonable searches and seizures.").
180. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
181. See Members of the Supreme Court of the United States,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/AO101281 .html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
182. Adams, 192 U.S. at 594 (citing I GREENLEAF ON EVIDENCE § 254a).
183. Pitler, supra note 46, at 467 (citing Adams, 192 U.S. at 598).
184. SeeAdams, 192 U.S. at 597-98.
185. See State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 P. 390 (1922).
[Vol. 31:431
The Origin ofArticle I, Section 7
enforcement officials were having with the public.1 86 Also, the U.S. Su-
preme Court resurrected what would become known as the "exclusionary
rule"' 87 in the 1914 case, Weeks v. United States,'88 holding that a trial
court committed prejudicial error by denying the application of an
accused for the return of letters obtained by law enforcement in violation
of the Fourth Amendment and then permitting the State to use those let-
ters at trial.189 In 1921, the U.S. Supreme Court reintroduced Boyd's
convergence theory and its view of the Fifth Amendment as prohibiting
an individual from being the unwilling source of incriminating evidence,
whether that evidence is in the form of testimony at trial or is the product
of an illegal search, in Gouled v. United States.190 By the mid-1920s,
fifteen states and the federal courts had adopted the exclusionary rule and
it was quite natural for scholars to speak of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments as providing protection against "compelled self-incrimination"
when discussing search and seizure law.191
At the time of its decision in State v. Gibbons, in 1922, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court did not face the strong opposition to Boyd that the
court faced seventeen years earlier in Royce. With Boyd's broad inter-
pretation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and convergence theory in
favor in the federal courts and a growing number of state courts, 192 the
Gibbons court quoted "from both the Federal and state constitutions to
show that these guaranties are in substance the same in both . ,193 Re-
lying upon the series of U.S. Supreme Court cases approving of the ex-
clusionary rule and Boyd convergence theory, the court concluded that,
by allowing evidence obtained in violation of article I, section 7 into a
criminal proceeding, the trial court compelled Gibbons to produce
186. Pitler, supra note 46, at 469.
187. The exclusionary rule provides that, in a criminal prosecution, evidence unlawfully seized
must be excluded from the proceedings. State v. Fisher, 145 Wash. 2d 209, 230 n.100, 35 P.3d 366,
377 n.100 (2001).
188. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
189. Id. at 398.
190. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303-06 (1921); see also Amos v. United States,
255 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1921).
191. ASHER L. CORNELIUS, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4-8 (1926).
192. Id. § 7 (1926) ("there has been a steady drift of authorities towards the exclusion doctrine
in recent years.").
193. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 184, 203 P. 390, 395 (1922). Thus, when the Washing-
ton Supreme Court stated that the guarantees in article 1, sections 7 and 9 and the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments are "in substance the same," it was referring to the broad interpretations of those
amendments given by specific U.S. Supreme Court cases of the late 1800s and early 1900s. See id.
at 184-87 (citing Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, 303-06 (1921); Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).
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evidence against himself, violating article I, section 9, and thereby err-
ing. 194 The court thus rejected the common law rule it embraced in State
v. Royce, and recognized the principles the Committee articulated by us-
ing the unique language in article I, sections 7 and 9.195
B. Constitutional Limitations
An analysis of the available historical materials suggests that there
are significant constitutional limitations on both the judiciary and the
legislature's ability to provide the law authorizing disturbances of resi-
dents' private affairs or invasions of their homes. But these limitations
are not provided for in article I, section 7 itself. While the plain language
of article I, section 7 "clearly recognizes an individual's right to privacy
with no express limitations,"'196 the plain language of the provision also
does not set forth constitutionally prescribed minimum standards such as
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness and probable cause require-
ments.
On the other hand, the provisions of Washington's Constitution, in-
cluding the Declaration of Rights, are "mandatory, unless by express
words they are declared to be otherwise."'' 97 Thus, any statute or com-
mon law principle is necessarily subject to the provisions in the Declara-
tion of Rights and other constitutional principles. These constitutional
principles, in addition to the political process and the common law, limit
the legislature and court's ability to authorize disturbances of residents'
private affairs or invasions of their homes.
First, having drafted article I, sections 7 and 9 to incorporate the
principles of the Boyd majority and Cooley, the Rights Committee likely
intended for article I, section 9 to act as an additional limitation on gov-
ernment intrusions. As Cooley noted regarding the "spirit" of the Fifth
Amendment, which the Committee meant for article I, section 9 to em-
body, a warrant may not be obtained for the sole purpose of obtaining
evidence that may be used against him, except in those instances
194. See Gibbons, 118 Wash. at 184-89, 203 P. at 395-96.
195. Nevertheless, the detriment to society's interest in law enforcement resulting from the
exclusionary doctrine's "proscription of what is concededly relevant evidence," must have weighed
heavily on the minds of the early state supreme courts. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166
(1986). Following Gibbons, the court began to manipulate search and seizure requirements and,
eventually, expanded the scope of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement
beyond its historical justification or precedent, in part, to avoid the exclusion remedy. Pitler, supra
note 46, at 476-78.
196. State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486, 493, 987 P.2d 73, 78 (1999) (quoting State v. White,
97 Wash. 2d 92, 100, 640 P.2d 1061, 1070-71 (1982)).
197. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 29.
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authorized by the legislature, for instance, for stolen goods or imple-
ments of counterfeiting.' 98 Thus, article I, section 9, would seem to en-
compass the requirements of express statutory authorization for magis-
trates to issue warrants for a particular purpose and some type of "prob-
able" or "good" cause requirement. 199 In addition, a statute such as the
one at issue in Boyd, whereby a government attorney may make a motion
to require the defendant to produce in court incriminating private books,
invoices, and papers, or the allegations of the attorney respecting them
are taken as confessed, would be prohibited by article I, section 9.200
Second, article I, section 3, the state due process clause, 20 1 also re-
stricts the ability of the courts or legislature to authorize intrusions into
the private affairs of residents. At the time of the framing, some state
supreme courts held that their own state due process clauses placed limi-
tations on the extent to which warrantless arrests could be made.202 Also,
it is well established that the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.20 3 Based on
the longstanding tradition of prohibiting such searches and seizures and
pervasiveness of the warrant requirement in American jurisprudence, the
Washington Supreme Court could draw a similar conclusion with respect
to the state due process clause.
In fact, a newspaper account during the crucial days the Committee
was revising the language of article I, section 7 suggests that the Rights
Committee was considering incorporating the "due process of law" lan-
guage directly into the provision. The Tacoma Daily Ledger reported on
198. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 75, at 371 n.5, 371-72.
199. Article I, section 9 also necessarily protects an individual from being compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, as provided by the Fifth Amendment. See State v.
Duncan, 7 Wash. 336, 342, 35 P. 117, 119 (1893) (Anders, J., concurring). Several early state su-
preme court cases discuss the protections afforded by article I, section 9. Perkins v. North End
Bank, 17 Wash. 100, 78 P.1019 (1904); State v. Washing, 36 Wash. 485, 78 P. 1019 (1904); State v.
Melvem, 32 Wash. 7, 72 P. 489 (1903); State v. O'Hara, 17 Wash. 525, 50 P. 477 (1897); State v.
Duncan, 7 Wash. 336 (1893). See also CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS supra note 75, at 371 n.5,
371-72, 386-88.
200. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1886).
201. "Due process" and "the law of the land," meant that life, liberty, and property were to be
held under the protection of the general rules that govern society. State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106,
110 P. 1020 (1910) (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 502 (7th ed.
1903)); see also CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, supra note 75, at 432-39.
202. 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 72 (10th ed. 1918). Some
courts held that their state due process clauses prohibited arrests without a warrant, except for felo-
nies and for breaches of the peace committed in the presence of an officer. Id. (citing In re Way, I
N.W. 1021 (1879); Pinkerton v. Verberg, 44 N.W. 579 (1889); State v. Hunter, 11 S.E. 366 (1890)).
Other states authorized warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed in the presence of an offi-
cer. Id.
203. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
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July 13, 1889, that in the following days, "[p]rovisions will be made to
prevent searching the residence of a private citizen without due process
of law. 2°4 The Committee, however, chose to draft a separate due proc-
ess clause, undoubtedly because it realized that, by drafting a separate
clause, the clause would necessarily govern any laws authorizing the dis-
turbance of residents' private affairs and the potential denial of life, lib-
erty, or property in other contexts.
Third, the nature of the legislative power itself serves as protection
against overreaching. Kilbourn and its progeny indicate that "no person
can be punished for contumacy as a witness (or is required to testify) be-
fore either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into which
that House has jurisdiction to inquire," such as those matters enumerated
in the Constitution.2°' Fifteen years later, in the case In re Chapman, the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a statute allowing a Senate committee to
summon witnesses and compel the production of documents in an inves-
tigation regarding whether certain Senators had made improper invest-
206ments. The Court distinguished Kilbourn by noting that the Senate has
the constitutional authority to punish its members for disorderly behav-
ior, expel members, and the inherent power of self protection and the
questions posed to the witness were not overly intrusive. The legislature,
the Court stated, must have the "constitutional power to enact a statute to
enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel them to make disclo-
sure of evidence to enable the respective bodies to discharge their le-
gitimate functions."° 7
Many years after the framing, in Robinson v. Fluent, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court elaborated on this principle:
[T]he powers of committees are not restricted to investigations upon
matters pertinent to legislation only. Legislative committees may
be created to investigate into any subject legitimately within the
204. The Bill of Rights-Other Provisions To Be Inserted, TACOMA DAILY LEDGER, July 13,
1889, at 4, col. 1.
205. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S 168, 190 (1881).
206. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
207. Id. at 671-72 (emphasis added). Of course, the federal government is a government of
enumerated powers and Washington State's government is vested with general powers. Thus, the
reach of the federal legislature to inquiry is necessarily limited by the powers enumerated in the
Constitution, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Bill of Rights. Therefore, the scope of mat-
ters for which the state legislature could potentially authorize a disturbance of the private affairs of
an individual in order to obtain information necessary to discharge its legitimate functions is much
larger.
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scope of the functions, powers, and duties of the legislature, and to
secure information necessary to the proper discharge thereof.
20 8
Such a power does not include, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Kil-
bourn, the "general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of
the citizen.,
20 9
Fourth, the separation of powers serves to prevent the legislature
from utilizing the courts to further legislative investigatory commissions
by compelling individuals to testify and produce documents, as in In re
Pacific Railway Commission. Finally, the protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment have been held to apply against the states through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including (1) the
prohibition of unreasonable searches or seizures, (2) the requirements for
a constitutionally valid warrant, and (3) the exclusionary rule, as defined
by the federal courts.21 0
Therefore, while the Washington Supreme Court is correct to ob-
serve that article I, section 7 is a two-step analysis when a search or sei-
zure is challenged for being conducted without the authority of law, a
three-step analysis is necessary when the legislature or courts have au-
thorized a disturbance or invasion: (1) whether a person's private affairs
were disturbed or home invaded; (2) whether the invasion or disturbance
was authorized by law; and (3) if so, whether the law authorizing such
action violates any other constitutional principle such as due process,
compelling a defendant to give incriminating evidence against himself,
separation of powers, or the Fourth Amendment made applicable to the
states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this way, significant
constitutional limitations still exist to ensure that resident's privacy inter-
ests are sufficiently protected.
V. CONCLUSION
When the seven men comprising the Rights Committee were
charged with drafting a state declaration of rights in July of 1889, they
were asked to do so in a time of rapid change, technologically, socially,
politically, and legally. The broad language that the Rights Committee,
framers, and ratifying public eventually chose for article I, section 7 was
a clear response to these changes, particularly the rapid advances in tech-
nology and attempts by the government to compel witnesses to testify
208. Robinson v. Fluent, 30 Wash. 2d 194, 202, 191 P.2d 241, 245 (1948).
209. Kilbourn, 103 U.S at 190.
210. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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and produce documents for various governmental bodies as demonstrated
by Kilbourn, Boyd, and Pacific Railway Commission.
By mandating that "no person shall be disturbed in his private af-
fairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law," the framers ensured
the provision would apply to all governmental interferences with resi-
dents' private affairs, not merely searches and seizures. The framers'
choice of "private affairs" was probably due to the advent of new tech-
nologies such as the camera and telephone and the need to protect far
more than simply tangible items including houses, persons, papers, and
effects. Any article I, section 7 analyses, therefore, must focus on a per-
son's personal affairs themselves, as opposed to engaging in a "protected
areas" analysis, as the U.S. Supreme Court once used for the Fourth
Amendment.
If the influence of Boyd and Entick is recognized, then the provi-
sion permitting government disturbances that are authorized by law re-
fers to a statute or common law principle. Under this arrangement, the
framers ensured that each branch of government will ensure that resi-
dents' private affairs receive sufficient protection and serve as a check on
the other. The provision also enables the legislature to authorize legisla-
tive or administrative committees to require witnesses to testify and to
produce documents necessary for those bodies to fulfill their constitu-
tional functions. Consequently, the framers left no doubt about whether
the legislature has the authority to summon witnesses and compel the
production of documents, avoiding similar questions that arose regarding
Congress's authority in the 1880s.
At the time of the framing, the "authority of law" ordinarily meant
a valid warrant or subpoena, though common law exceptions for war-
rantless searches and seizures did exist. Legislation in 1893 authorizing
officers upon oral complaint to conduct a warrantless arrest of persons
who engaged in cruel acts towards children, animals, fowl, or birds, a
misdemeanor arrest which could not be made at common law, demon-
strates that the framers likely conceived of a greater legislative role in
governing disturbances of residents' private affairs than the courts have
traditionally accepted. Thus, while the protection that article I, section 7
provides is undoubtedly broader, it is also somewhat more malleable
than the protection provided by the Fourth Amendment. However, sig-
nificant constitutional restraints such as the state due process clause and
article I, section 9 limit the extent to which the authority of law may be
provided.
Finally, the broad language the Rights Committee chose for article
I, sections 7 and 9, the latter of which mirrors the description of the
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"spirit" of the Fifth Amendment found in both the Boyd majority opinion
and Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, suggests that the framers in-
tended to incorporate the conclusions of the Boyd majority into the pro-
visions. The Boyd majority believed that the government's use of evi-
dence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment was functionally
identical to compelling a defendant to give evidence (or testify) against
himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 2 1' The Boyd majority
deemed any such proceeding "erroneous and unconstitutional. 21 2 Wash-
ington, therefore, has a constitutionally mandated exclusionary rule.
The Washington Supreme Court observed in State v. Gibbons that
the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment and article I, section
7 were "in substance the same. 21 3 It made this statement during the
early 1920s, after the U.S. Supreme Court resurrected the sweeping con-
clusions of the Boyd majority. By the time the court reiterated this
proposition in 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected Boyd and
equating the meaning of the two provisions was no longer justified. In
State v. Simpson, the Washington Supreme Court took an important first
step toward recapturing the original meaning of article I, section 7; it ac-
knowledged the stark difference between its language and that in the
Fourth Amendment, and then engaged in an independent analysis of the
214provision. But a truly principled analysis also requires a close exami-
nation of the rationale behind the framers' decision to adopt the unique
language in article I, section 7.
Looking back at the available historical evidence to determine the
original intent of the framers, it is clear that they drafted a provision that
can stand the test of time. The broad language in article I, section 7 will
always require that official interferences with the private affairs of resi-
dents are governed by precise and predetermined legal principles. But by
allowing for disturbances made with the authority of law, the framers
also allowed future generations to play a role in shaping their privacy
rights, provided the relevant constitutional limitations are respected.
Consequently, it is not hard to imagine the framers looking at Washing-
ton's present residents, legislators, judges, and justices and asking them
what value they place on privacy today.
211. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886).
212. Id. at 638.
213. 118 Wash. 171, 184, 203 P. 390, 394 (1922).
214.95 Wash. 2d 170, 177, 622 P.2d 1199, 1205 (1980)
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